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Since the fall of the Ottoman empire, Kurdish nationalism has developed as an ideology 
within a regional state system where Kurds lack national representation or recognition. This 
ideology has manifested itself into a fractured movement where the contemporary state borders that 
separate the Kurdish population at large have proven to be both a limiting and a creative factor. 
This thesis examines the history of Kurdish nationalism in Syria with a focus on both the local 
context as defined by Syria’s borders in addition to the broader region, for the politics of Kurds in 
Syria have clearly been shaped by interactions with the Syrian state as well as the regional Kurdish 
nationalist movement and interstate dynamics. In order to carry this out, this paper employs a 
methodological framework largely informed by the work of Hamit Bozarslan. 
This theoretical underpinning conceptualizes Kurdish nationalist actors as existing within a 
broader ‘minority sphere’ where they interact with each other, various ‘state spheres,’ and the 
Kurdish population at large. While manifestations of Kurdish nationalism are informed by 
interactions with processes of state formation in their local contexts, nationalist actors are also 
shaped by ‘crossborder’ communication with the broader Kurdish minority sphere. The degree to 
which this crossborder dynamic is available to Kurdish nationalist actors largely depends on 
v  
regional interstate relations; in periods of status quo borders are strong and penetration is difficult, 
whereas in periods of interstate conflict borders become porous and states will engage with 
adjacent Kurdish actors in an effort to undermine rivals.  
 Using this framework, this paper examines the secondary literature and primary sources 
relating to the history of the Kurdish movement within Syria, with a focus on three main events and 
their aftereffects: the 1962 al-Hasakah census, the entrance of the PKK into Syria from Turkey, and 
the 2004 al-Qamishli uprising. These endeavors further highlight the importance of interstate 
conflict in strengthening crossborder Kurdish nationalism, but additionally point to how the 
temporary opening of room for Kurdish nationalist actors to operate creates new dynamics within 
the local Kurdish minority sphere which the state struggles to address after a status quo reemerges.  
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Seeking international recognition on behalf of one of the world’s largest stateless 
ethnolinguistic minorities, the Kurdish nationalist movement has attracted significant scholarly 
attention over the past half century. The majority of this work has focused on the politics of 
Kurdish populations residing within the states of Turkey and Iraq. Within these two states, as 
well as Iran, the Kurdish nationalist movement has repeatedly engaged in armed conflict against 
the state and achieved varying degrees of autonomy at times, with the current Kurdistan Region 
of Iraq representing the greatest success in recognized self-rule. Historically an outlier in this 
regard, Kurdish nationalist activity in Syria has been overshadowed by these neighboring 
manifestations, both within the regional movement, as well as in terms of international media 
attention and scholarship.  
This neglect can be attributed to demographic considerations and geography. Syria is 
home to a relatively small portion of the world’s Kurds, estimated at around five million out of 
the total 30 to 40 million. However, Kurds have consistently made up approximately ten percent 
of the total Syrian population, making them the largest ethnolinguistic minority in the country. 
Unlike other parts of Kurdistan, Syria’s Kurds are geographically dispersed; primarily residing 
within three distinct regions across the country’s north, today most commonly referred to as 
‘Rojava,’ meaning ‘the West’ in Kurdish. In addition, large Kurdish communities reside with 
major cities of Syria such as Damascus and Aleppo.  
The trajectory of Kurdish nationalist politics within Syria has taken a different shape than 
adjacent iterations in neighboring states. While nationalist activism was carried out to various 
degrees in the preceding decades, it wasn’t until 1957 that the first Kurdish nationalist political 
party was formed. Banned by the government within just a year, Kurdish parties have existed 
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illegally ever since, negotiating the tiny, fluid operating space awarded to them by the state, 
frequently splintering into little more minute organizations run by individual families. Since 
coming to power in 1963, the Ba‘th party and the authoritarian grip it's held over the country has 
obstructed scholarly and media research access to Kurdish communities within Syria and their 
struggle to secure cultural rights and political representation. 
These dynamics have changed dramatically since 2011, as a Kurdish political party 
seized power within the vacuum of the ensuing civil war and established authority over much of 
northern Syria. The ‘Rojava’ political project now rivals the autonomous Kurdistan Region of 
Iraq (KRI) terms of its position within global Kurdish political imaginations and has far 
surpassed any successes in achieving brief and localized forms of autonomy in Turkish or Iranian 
Kurdistan. This new administration, led by the Partîya Yekîtiya Dêmokrat (PYD), has attracted 
considerable regional and international attention, and has overseen a rupture from the past as 
foreign journalists and researchers have gained unprecedented access to Kurdish-populated 
regions of Syria. Additionally, the proliferation of social media usage has contributed to the 
creation of a new public sphere, in which a diversity of Syrian Kurdish voices interact with each 
other, the region, and the world at large.  
The rapid rise of the PYD in Syria has led to what some have referred to as a current 
‘bifurcation’1 of regional Kurdish politics. This bifurcation lies between the older ethno-
nationalist, state-focused approach to the Kurdish issue, represented most prominently by the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in the KRI, and the ‘democratic confederalist’ model put 
forth by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and affiliated parties such as the PYD in Syria. An 
ideology developed by Abdullah Öcalan, in many ways a response to his 1999 arrest and 
 
1 Yasin Sunca, “The Bifurcated Trajectory of Nation Formation in Kurdistan: Democratic Confederalism, 
Nationalism, and the Crisis of Capitalist Modernity,” Nations and Nationalism (2020): 1. 
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imprisonment by Turkey, democratic confederalism rejects the formation of a Kurdish nation-
state in favor of a ‘confederal’ system based on local democratic councils. While ideologically 
this places the PYD and PKK outside the pantheon of Kurdish nationalist parties, in practice the 
relationship between the PYD and Kurdish nationalism is more ambiguous. Prior to 2011, the 
PYD was largely focused on the struggle for Kurdish national rights inside Syria, working 
alongside the dozens of older nationalist parties. Despite its democratic confederalist ideology, 
its early war activities occurred solely within Kurdish society and ethnic identity remained a key 
aspect of the party’s legitimation and mobilization.2 Since the expansion of the ‘Rojava’ project 
into non-Kurdish areas and the creation of the Autonomous Administration, party discourse has 
noticeably shifted away from direct references to Kurdishness, Kurdistan, and even its usage of 
the name Rojava, instead using the term ‘northern Syria,’3 to refer to the region. However, 
limited contemporary studies conducted in the area show that significant support for the PYD 
and the Autonomous Administration among Kurds in Syria continues to stem from an 
association of the party with Kurdish identity and its defense of national rights.4 As of right now, 
it is too early to form a proper understanding of what effects this will have on Kurdish 
nationalism and mobilization going forward. 
With the success of the Autonomous Administration, achieved largely by the labor of 
Kurds from Syria, has come accusations labelling it a foreign import imposed on Syrian 
Kurdistan by outside actors. These denunciations are frequently launched by Kurdish rivals to 
the PYD, whether local to Syria or from other parts of Kurdistan. Such attacks hinge on the 
organizational and ideological genealogy of the PYD as the organization which, while formed in 
 
2 Harriet Allsopp & Wladimir van Wilgenburg, The Kurds of Northern Syria: Governance, Diversity and Conflicts 
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 63, 78. 
3 Ibid., 83. 
4 Ibid., 158. 
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Syria in the early 2000s, was created by members of the PKK and continues to view Abdullah 
Öcalan as the party’s ideological leader. In response, emblematic of the current Kurdish 
‘bifurcation,’ partisans of the PYD will point to their local rivals’ long history of organization 
and financial ties to the Kurdish parties of Iraq. The commonality and saliency of these 
discursive attacks as well as the intertwined histories of parties within the regional Kurdish 
nationalist movement raises interesting questions. As representatives of a stateless nationalism 
existing regionally across several nation-states, Kurdish nationalist actors claim to speak and act 
on behalf for all Kurds and for Kurdistan. Despite this, when engaged in intra-Kurdish 
competition, discourses related to authenticity and legitimacy invoked the local, defined largely 
by the borders imposed by the modern nation-state system with no regard to Kurdish claims. 
How have manifestations of Kurdish nationalism within Syria been defined by the Syrian 
context? Are the roles played by Kurdish actors from outside the country’s borders external 
interventions onto the local or internal developments from within the nation? Rather than attempt 
to find and assign nationalist authenticity and legitimacy to specific Kurdish actors, this paper 
seeks to interrogate the historical dynamics of Kurdish politics within Syria as members of the 
movement interacted with the populations they sought to represent, with the processes of Syrian 
state formation, and with developments located in the wider regional Kurdish nationalist 
movement as a whole.  
As a stateless nationalism operating regionally across several states, the position of Kurdish 
nationalist politics represents a methodological issue. Analyzing such a movement is complicated by its 
presence both within a local context, as well as part of a broader intertwined phenomenon, located above 
and below the modern state borders laying atop Kurdistan. These regional dynamics requires one to 
move past normative approaches to the study of state-society relations, typically enclosed within the 
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territorial borders that define the modern state. One cannot work to understanding Kurdish nationalism 
within Syria without interrogating how the movement and those acting in its name have interacted with 
and been shaped by the evolving Syrian state over time. Simultaneously, to study these politics without 
engaging the rich transborder history of Kurdish nationalism would be imposing boundaries on such, 
ones not recognized by its ideological constituents, while additionally excluding actors, events and ideas 
that undeniably crossed and reverberated throughout Kurdistan.  
To move past this quandary an approach is required that will allow for one to analyze the 
history of the Kurdish nationalist movement within Syria while maintain a balance between both 
the local and the regional dynamics. More specifically this means an effort to simultaneously 
parse out the impacts of the state context, the wider Kurdish world, and the actions of Kurdish 
political actors and the broad Kurdish public itself. This paper will employ a theoretical 
framework that does so while examining three pivotal events within the history of the Kurdish 
movement in Syria. These are the 1962 al-Hasakah census; which left hundreds of thousands of 
Kurds residing in northern Syria stateless, the entrance of the PKK into Syria from Turkey; 
permanently altering the nationalist movement in several different ways, and the 2004 al-
Qamishli uprising; the first large violently anti-state manifestation of Kurdish nationalism within 
Syria. Each of these will be contextualized within the stages of Syrian state formation they 
occurred under and the impact that interactions with such had on these events and on the 
trajectory of the movement. Furthermore, the regional dimensions of these events will be 
examined, with a focus on how both other contemporaneous manifestations of Kurdish 
nationalism outside of Syria and Syrian Kurdistan’s position within transborder Kurdish 




The theoretical underpinning of this paper hinges on a conceptualization laid out by 
Hamit Bozarslan, who sought to move past analysis of Kurdish nationalism that either examines 
manifestations of such as completely sequestered within modern borders, or as existing 
regardless of such. This framework examines cross-border nationalisms through a model 
consisting of ‘state and minority spheres.’ In the case of Kurdistan, four different state spheres 
exist, exercising control over the portions of Kurdistan allotted by the series of treaties and 
agreements that created the post-Ottoman borders. The minority sphere “is not politically defined 
or instituted and above all, does not enjoy any legal recognition,”5 but instead a field 
comprising of Kurdish populations and political actors spread out across these four states. This is 
often times far from a politically unified entity, as various actors and organizations compete with 
one another, employing various symbolic configurations, visions of social order, rewards and 
sanctions, in vying for hegemony within the sphere. The Kurdish minority sphere expands and 
contracts according to the material and informational porousness of these borders, the success 
and failure of political actors at nationalist mobilization, and the structural constraints 
represented by downward pressure from the state spheres.  
While Bozarslan highlights the fluid nature of the minority sphere, his work does little to 
address periods where nationalist mobilization failed to materialize, such as the first half of the 
twentieth century in Syria. Throughout this era and beyond, Kurdish nationalism competed with 
other ideologies and political identities mobilized by different actors within the Kurdish minority 
sphere. To account for periods in which mobilization did not occur or occurred on axes other 
than Kurdish nationalism, further discussion relating to the politicization of ethnic identity and 
 
5 Hamit Bozarslan, La Question Kurde (Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, 1997), 299.  
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the development and spread of nationalism is required. 
In his critique of the term ‘group’ and its usage as a unit of analysis with regards to the 
study of ethnicity, race and nation, Rogers Brubaker writes: “'Group' functions as a seemingly 
unproblematic, taken-for-granted concept, apparently in no need of particular scrutiny or 
explication.”6 In turn this frequently causes social scientists to treat ‘ethnic groups’ as “internally 
homogenous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common 
purposes,”7 rather than “in terms of practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, 
discursive frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects and contingent 
events.”8 Political mobilization along ethnic lines is not a given, but rather contingent on 
structural advantages or constraints, actor’s agency, and to what degree ‘groupness’ is self-
identified with by proposed members. Rather than simply mapping to an ethnically categorized 
segment of the population, ethnically framed politics are pursued and carried out by different 
actors and organizations considering themselves within and representative of this category. 
These observations speak to both the historically fractured political nature of Bozarslan’s 
Kurdish minority sphere, as well as the ebbs and flows of mobilization capabilities by nationalist 
political actors.  
While Brubaker’s framework portrays “groupness as a contextually fluctuating 
conceptual variable,”9 it is hard to deny an overall historical upward trajectory in terms of global 
affiliation with a nation. In her work on Kurdish political parties and identity in Syria, Harriet 
Allsopp writes of the early twenty first century that; “in general, the Kurdish population in Syria 
 
6 Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity without Groups,” Archives Européennes de Sociologie. European Journal of 
Sociology. 43, no. 2 (2002): 163. 
7 Ibid., 164. 
8 Ibid., 167. 
9 Ibid., 167.  
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was more nationalistic, more prone to political action and thirsty for change than ever before.”10 
One hundred years prior, in the final decade of the Ottoman empire which most Kurdish 
populations were subjects of, Kurdish nationalist politics was almost exclusively the domain of 
educated elite residing in the imperial Istanbul metropole. Nationalism, at its core the idea that 
humanity is divided into entities entitled nations and that these represent the ideal basis of 
sovereign political units, did not become the governing principle of Middle Eastern states until 
the empire’s collapse. As the historical shortcomings of nationalist mobilization both within 
Syria and across the region are apparent in spite of a growing affinity with Kurdish national 
identity in the Kurdish minority sphere, additional dynamics must be addressed in order to 
understand the growth of nationalism occurring, in part, outside the efforts of nationalist 
organizations. 
In his seminal 1983 study, Benedict Anderson defines the nation as “an imagined 
political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”11 Anderson posits 
that all communities larger than a village are ‘imagined,’ as membership does not rest on face-to-
face interaction but in the perception that oneself and others belong to a “horizontal 
comradeship.”12 The boundaries of a nation are distinct as they represent a defined segment of 
humanity, unlike ever expansive imagined communities of a universalistic variety. Lastly, 
“nations dream of being free…the gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.”13 
Anderson’s primary thesis is that the development of the concept of nation and it as the principal 
bedrock of political authority and organization was both made possible and in turn popularized 
 
10 Harriet Allsopp, The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East (London: IB Tauris & Co. 
Ltd., 2015), 190. 
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 2016), 6. 
12 Ibid., 7. 
13 Ibid., 7. 
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by ‘print-capitalism,’ which caused a historically unprecedented proliferation of media printed in 
vernacular languages. While ‘nation-ness’ is commonly linked to a specific shared linguistic 
background, “the most important thing about language is its capacity for generating imagined 
communities, building in effect particular solidarities.”14 While the economic and technological 
processes Anderson labels as ‘print-capitalism’ are arguably specific to previous centuries, more 
contemporary “advances in communications technology, especially radio and television, give 
print allies unavailable a century ago,”15 only furthering the reach of ideas of nation-ness.  
The regional Kurdish population is divided amongst speakers of different dialects, most 
notable Kurmancî, Soranî, and Zaza, lacking a high degree of mutual intelligibility between one 
another. Prior to the twentieth century these linguistic populations primarily resided within either 
the Ottoman or Persian empires. While Kurdish was spoken in daily life and used in a limited 
extent by poets and local religious scholars, Turkish and Farsi where the primary languages of 
administrative affairs, and accordingly were far more prevalent in written form. This linguistic 
hierarchy continued into the post-World War I era within Turkey and Iran, while Arabic, 
alongside French and English, became the official languages of newly formed mandates of Syria 
and Iraq, respectively. Kurds across these four nascent states interacted with their respective 
governments in three different languages. The aforementioned linguistic diversity of Kurdish 
presented a further obstruction to the spread of any sort of common crossborder vernacular. 
Additionally, both Turkish and Kurmancî Kurdish came to be written using the Latin rather than 
Arabic alphabet, further segmenting regional language. Cognizant of the power of language and 
of Ataturk’s ‘modernization’ reforms with regards to Turkish, certain early Kurdish nationalists 
did work to standardize Kurdish and spread publications. However, the lack of state backing and 
 
14 Ibid., 133.  
15 Ibid., 135. 
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the high amount of illiteracy amongst Kurdish populations saw the results of such efforts develop 
incrementally.  
Despite this disunity, popular affiliation with the ‘Kurdish nation’ continued to grow over 
the course the twentieth century. In recent decades, new communication technologies, in 
particular satellite television and the internet, have had a noticeable effect in inculcating a sense 
of Kurdishness across state borders. These have given Kurds new spaces to engage one another 
outside the purview of the state, increasingly independent from the efforts of Kurdish nationalist 
political actors. This demonstrates that these processes highlighted by Anderson, working to 
establish the Kurdish minority sphere as a politically salient ‘imagined community’ often 
become autonomous from top-down attempts at instrumentalization from nationalist political 
elite. 
Undoubtedly related, this period of time globally witnessed the normalization of nation 
and nationalist discourses leading to these conceptualizations essentially becoming hegemonic in 
the present. Anderson writes:  
 
the very idea of ‘nation’ is now nestled firmly in virtually all print-languages; and nation-
ness is virtually inseparable from political consciousness. In a world in which the national 
state is the overwhelming norm, all of this means that nations can now be imagined 
without linguistic communality…out of a general awareness of what modern history has 
demonstrated to be possible.16 
 
In the immediate post-World War I context, international discourse gave the national form 
 
16 Ibid., 135.  
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significant attraction, particularly among educated elite. Inextricable from the postwar 
settlements which sought to dictate the fate of former Ottoman territory, Woodrow Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points and the creation of the League of Nations emphasized to many “that nationalism 
was becoming the language of legitimacy, the idiom though which various social and political 
battles would be fought.”17 However, while this discourse was significant to the proliferation of 
Kurdish nationalist organizations in this era, this did not lead to large scale engagement and 
mobilization within the Kurdish minority sphere.  
Subsequently, the concept of a nation has been inculcated within Kurds across Kurdistan 
through subjection to processes of ‘nation-formation’ by the states whose sovereignty they reside 
under. These processes have largely hinged on an exclusionary nationalist ideology which mark 
Kurds as a national other, outside the national definition of the state. Nation formation includes 
self-conscious efforts by nationalist policy makers to eradicate Kurdish identity or subsume it 
within the official national identity of the state, as well as more mundane and routine dynamics 
including the effects centralized bureaucracy, schooling, and military service can have in 
emphasizing and reinforcing political and geographic identity. Such experiences normalize and 
emphasize the frameworks of nation and nation-ness, imbuing these with natural, self-evident 
properties, while simultaneously highlighting the ‘otherness’ of a Kurdish identity. As “outsider 
identities can be understood at the dialectics of national identity constructed through outsiders 
and an outside identity constructed through a historical consciousness of state violence”18 the 
violent approach taken by the Syrian state to Kurdishness in turn gave Kurdish identity increased 
saliency.  
 
17 Janet Klein, The Margins of Empire Kurdish Militias in the Ottoman Tribal Zone (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011), 172. 
18 Ozlem Goner, Turkish National Identity and Its Outsiders: Memories of State Violence in Dersim (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2017), 86. 
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As demonstrated, the minority sphere is far from a static entity, but instead has undergone 
processes of formation, development and reproduction. The same can be observed when examining the 
configurations of state spheres. The material and discursive forms of the modern state are divergent from 
their predecessors, as too are its borders; how they’re delineated and imposed, and what they signify. 
The modern state aspires to impose its authority uniformly within its internationally recognized borders. 
This requires a physical delineation of such borders and attempts to reorient the populations found along 
them away from previous power configurations and social relations incongruent to these new borders 
and towards the state itself. 
In order to place the Kurdish nationalist movement within both the Syrian and broader Kurdish 
contexts theoretical conceptualizations of state and society at large would be helpful. One approach to 
such portrays  
 
…society as a mélange of social organization…including the idea of the state as well as 
many others…[which] offer individuals strategies of personal survival and, for some, 
strategies of upward mobility. Individual choice among strategies is based on the material 
incentives and coercion organizations can bring to bear and on the organizations’ use of 
symbols and values concerning how social life should be ordered.19 
 
The state is one such social organization, offering its own vision of social ordering. What sets the 
state apart, particularly in the modern era, is its drive to achieve sovereignty over all other social 
organizations. Historically, “social control has not been of a piece, but it has frequently been 
 
19 Joel S. Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 49. 
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highly fragmented through a territory,”20 through this diversity has declined over time. The 
development and proliferation of the modern state system has incentivized the state to gain 
increasing hegemony over the society it claims to represent, both in order to martial resources 
and manpower to protect itself international and due to the modern state becoming the globally 
hegemonic form of political ordering. Neither state nor society are static entities, as both 
constantly undergo “a process of interaction of groupings with one another and with those whose 
actual behavior they are vying to control or influence,”21 leading to constant dynamism and 
reproduction.  
 The state itself is made up of both material and discursive components that cast forth an 
image of a unified entity, both set apart from society while claiming to be comprised of and 
representing it and set apart from other states. This image can be reinforced or contradicted by 
the practices employed by the state, parts of the state, or individuals claiming state authority. In 
his work seeking to define the state, Bob Jessop writes that “the core of the state apparatus 
comprises a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose socially accepted function 
is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name 
of their common interest of general will.”22 Jessop outlines six dimensions of the state, attributes 
belonging to either the institutional or to the behavioral, with both categories including material 
and discursive. The former includes the various forms of representation that states claim, how 
power is distributed within the administration, and how and to what extent intervention is 
conducted upon society and the economy, while the latter consist of the social base of the state, 
 
20 Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third 
World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 27. 
21 Migdal, State in Society, 23. 
22 Bob Jessop, State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1990), 341. 
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the “practices and projects which define the boundaries of the state system and endow it with a 
degree of internal unity,”23 and the discourse employed by the state in defining those they 
represent. Typically, the institutional dimensions of the state display a degree of continuity while 
the behavioral are more prone to fluctuation due to strategic decisions made by the “core of the 
state apparatus.” The behavioral elements, or the practices of the state, often serve “serve to 
recognize, reinforce, and validate, not only the territorial element of state control, but also the 
social separation between the state and other social formations in numerous ways,”24 buttressing 
state power and contributing to its hegemony in daily life. However, Joel Migdal’s 
conceptualization highlights that state practices do not always align with the image of the state 
and can “batter the image of a coherent, controlling state and neutralize the territorial and public-
private boundaries.”25 Behavior that contradicts state discourse can be caused by a number of 
factors, including international conflict dynamics, which may cause the state to temporarily cede 
room to different social organizations for strategic purposes. 
 While these various theories of state are valuable in highlighting the continued 
reproduction and dynamism of the state, its material as well as discursive components, and 
convergences and divergences between image and practice, they are inadequate when applied to 
the case of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria. While an international dynamic is present 
in such theories, it is at a state-to-state level. State competition drives the state apparatus to seek 
social hegemony in order to be able to martial resources and mobilize its subjects. But Migdal’s 
model does not address social organizations existing both within and without his societal 
vacuum, whose conceptions of social order do not fall neatly within the physical boundaries 
 
23 Ibid., 346. 
24 Migdal, State in Society, 18. 
25 Ibid., 19. 
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containing both state and society.  
Bozarslan highlights the role of the interstate relations with regards to the conditions of 
the minority sphere at a given time. When a regional status quo between the states has existed, 
the borders existing over the Kurdish sphere harden and governments hold significant ability to 
implement policies directed at their respective populations, causing both a shrinkage in the 
sphere and a localization of Kurdish nationalist activity. Inversely, the Kurdish sphere has 
potential to grow when this interstate status quo dissipates. While states can still “implement 
more or less effective management instruments [such as coercion or limited incorporation] at the 
‘internal’ level, …[they often] find themselves helpless at the ‘regional’ level,”26 due to tactics 
employed by rival antagonistic states. This includes the conducting of ‘parallel diplomacy,’ or 
the engagement with the Kurdish political actors within the borders of rival states. During these 
periods of interstate conflict borders increase in permeability and the Kurdish cross-border 
dynamic becomes strong. Nationalist parties engage in this parallel diplomacy, collaborating 
with states that oppress the Kurdish populations within their own territories, as it is the only form 
of international recognition available to them, and it benefits them in opening up new financial 
and human resources to mobilize, representing a rear base for their own local conflict. Through 
‘parallel diplomacy,’ Kurdish nationalist actors are able to bypass the structural limitations as 
represented by the state system, ‘regionalizing’ their activities and their reach to parts of 
Kurdistan previously off limits. However, this regionalization present contradictions as such 
actors maintain objectives orientated towards the local context they originated in and are unable 
to address the political aspirations of other Kurdish populations. While a state centric approach 
focuses on the relations of a state with its subject populations as well as with one another on the 
 
26 Bozarslan, 312. 
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international stage, this approach put forth by Bozarslan sees actors at all levels as capable of 
existing within and across borders, interacting with a multitude of actors, including at the 
international state level.  
 This paper will examine the Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria as part of a fluid 
‘minority sphere,’ a field consisting of a host of actors seeking to further their political projects 
amongst the ‘minority’ population. As nationalists, the actors and organizations within the 
movement sought to mobilize amongst the Kurds of Syria along the lines of national identity. 
Existing under the sovereignty of the Syrian state sphere meant the evolution of such was shaped 
by various periods of Syrian state formation and the broader regional political context these 
occurred under. While the actions of these actors created a Kurdish nationalist movement, further 
instilling national identity as a politically salient category within Syria, broader ‘crossborder’ 
dynamics outside the hands of local actors were also at play. These include the travel or 
migration of Kurdish nationalist actors from other parts of Kurdistan to Syria, and the flow of 
intellectual and cultural production. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite the 
‘recurring failure’27 of the local Kurdish parties, the Kurdish national identity represented the 
dominant political identity within the Kurdish minority sphere. 
The French Mandate of Syria 
The nucleus of the modern Syrian state was formed under French colonial occupation, 
lasting from the conclusion of the brief 1920 French Syrian war until 1946. This period saw the 
solidification of Syria’s borders, represented by the separation of Lebanon and the demarcation 
of Syria from Turkey and Iraq, the gradual centralization of the territory around the city of 
Damascus, and the developing saliency of amorphous Arab nationalist sentiments, coalescing 
 
27 Sunca, 7. 
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around resistance to French imperialism. French rule was characterized by an underlying tension 
between the colonial interests of the metropole and the terms of the mandate as awarded to 
France by the League of Nations. The result of this contradiction, in which colonial policy 
sought to forestall the potential Syrian independence it was supposed to nurture, meant that “if 
the French did their best to hinder the development of a ‘nation’ in Syria, they were nonetheless 
obliged to construct a state.”28 In order to prevent Arab nationalist (anti-imperialist) state 
capture, viewed as the greatest potential threat to colonial rule, the French turned to various non-
Sunni and non-Arab interlocutors. Primarily this involved enlisting those on the sectarian and 
economic peripheries in the colonial military, the Armée du Levant, in addition to experiments 
with awarding local autonomy to geographically compact religious minorities, represented by the 
Druze and the ‘Alawi.  
As was the case within different communities around Syria, politics within Kurdish 
populated areas “included a variety of interest groups whose cohesion rested on different type of 
loyalties to family, religious community, tribe, urban quarter and village.”29 Dispersed by 
geography and historical origins, Kurds within the French Mandate of Syria interacted and 
affiliated with a diverse array of political identities. The social relationships and economic 
activity of Kurdish populations in the northern Jarabulus and northeastern Jazira regions were 
largely orientated towards settlements now north of the Turkish border, such as Jazira bin ‘Umar, 
Mardin, Nusaybin, and Urfa, rather than with one another or south towards Damascus. Economic 
and political life within the northwest Kurd Dagh (commonly referred to today as Efrîn) district 
had long been intertwined with the city of Aleppo, the focus of commercial activity for the 
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region. Far removed from ‘contiguous Kurdistan,’ the inhabitants of several districts on the 
western outskirts of Damascus represented the largest urban Kurdish population in Syria. While 
“40% of the local Kurdish population was entirely Arabicized,”30 this community’s centuries 
long martial role within local Ottoman administrations and local rule through clientelism of two 
key family’s work to demarcate the Kurds of Hayy al-Akrad from other inhabitants of the 
capital. Speaking to the diverse political identities of these populations in relation to both new 
and old power configurations, Kurds within Syria were mobilized to various degrees of success 
by an array of political actors in this period, some in opposition to French rule, others in support. 
While early manifestations of the Kurdish nationalist movement were present, other examples of 
Mandate era political activity include but are not limited to; sporadic anti-French revolts 
mobilized through pan-Islamic discourse with Turkish support, a Sufi-led revolt against local 
elites in Kurd Dagh, nationwide recruitment into the Syrian Communist Party headed by 
Damascene Kurd Khalid Bekdash, participation in the Arab nationalist movement against the 
French, and a French-backed multi-ethnic local autonomous movement in the Jazira.  
Most notably, this vast range of mobilizations demonstrates the magnetism of the new 
state. With Damascus at its center and the French as the sovereign power, political actors within 
Syria increasingly came to negotiate with or focus their opposition towards the state. Some such 
actors came to appropriate new political concepts such as national majority and minority when 
dealing with the French, to secure power within the new system. Early petitions sent by regional 
elites to the French colonial government demanding autonomy highlight such entrepreneurial 
and cognizant behavior. For example, in 1924, one such appeal from a Nuri Kandy of Kurd Dagh 
stressed the role Kurdish autonomy could play in protecting the Mandate by counterbalancing 
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weakening Arab nationalists.31 While it is difficult if not impossible to parse out many actors’ 
nationalist from material motivations in this period, it is evident that the new geographic and 
structural reality shaped political activity within the mandate. While many Kurds living in the 
north of the country experienced rupture from what were now crossborder affiliations, new 
avenues opened up, and “one potential field for political cooperation was provided by cultural 
identity.”32 
The primary manifestation of Kurdish nationalism during the French Mandate period was 
“nurtured primarily among a community of Kurdish emigres who arrived in Syria from Turkey 
after 1925.”33 This included an assortment of nationalism intellectual elite and tribal elements, 
fleeing Turkey in the wake of the several failed Kurdish uprisings of this period, beginning with 
the Sheikh Said rebellion. A number of these figures were instrumental in the 1927 founding of 
the Xwebûn in Beirut, an association “primarily conceived as the political and propaganda 
bureau of a military organization, based around Mount Ararat,”34 who initially focused their 
attentions on mobilized local tribal support for the rebellion. While the group soon ceased to 
exist after the Ararat revolt was crushed by the Turkish state in 1930, certain key members of its 
former leadership turned their attentions to the Kurdish communities within Syria, seeking to 
cultivate nationalist sentiment. Most notable among these was Jeladet Bedirxan and his brother 
Kamuran, grandsons of the last emir of Ottoman Kurdish principality of Botan. As armed 
resistance against the Turkish state had proved futile yet again, the Bedirxan’s dedicated 
themselves to cultural activities. These included the compilation of a Kurdish-French dictionary, 
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and the publication of Hawar, a month journal written in Kurmancî using the Latin alphabet, 
both serving “to standardize the grammar and writing of modern Kurmancî Kurdish, and 
provided an important common reference for educated Kurds throughout the region.”35 With its 
contributors coming from the diverse pool of former Xwebûn leaders, Hawar “opened a dialogue 
among the various strata of Kurdish society in Syria: among the educated classes on the one 
hand, and between the urban and tribal elites on the other,”36 putting literate members of Syria’s 
diverse and disparate Kurdish population in communication with one another in a unprecedented 
manner.  
Highly significant to this paper and discussions of Kurdish nationalism in Syria at large 
are developments occurring in the northeastern Jazirah district in the mandate era. That this area 
initially far outside pre-mandate conceptions of geographic Syria was to become “the primary 
area of Arab-Kurdish tension”37 within the twentieth century is unsurprising for a number of 
factors. The broader Jazirah region (Kurdish: Cizîrê) refers to the vast areas lying between the 
Tigris and Euphrates, reaching north and east into present day Turkey and Iraq. Historically, the 
Jazirah was home to a diverse linguistic and religious communities including Arabs, Kurds, and 
Syriac Christians. The portion of the Jazirah that was integrated within the French Mandate of 
Syria did not have a large sedentary population at the time, instead largely populated by nomadic 
pastoralist Arab and Kurdish tribes, respectively oriented south towards Arabia and north 
towards Anatolia. During the mandate era, two processes came to define the Jazirah district; 
sedentarization, including the founding of the modern region’s largest cities, al-Hasakah and al-
Qamishli (Kurdish: Qamişlo), and refugee flows, both of which were facilitated by the French 
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administration in various capacities. The later initially involved Armenian and Assyrian 
Christian refugees created by the Ottoman genocides and the continued by the Turkish republic, 
though after 1925, Kurds came to numerical dominance within this influx. To the French, these 
communities represented potential clients and allies, to be used against rising anti-French Arab 
nationalism. This flow of refugees and the support such communities received by the French 
soon drew the ire of Arab nationalists in western Syria. Within the nationalist press, vital 
importance was placed on the region, as articles warning of ‘separatist’ plots, including 
allegations that “‘Kurdish refugees are working to establish a national home’ in Syria,”38 drew a 
clear analogy to the contemporaneous activities of the Zionist movement in Palestine. The first 
nationalist schemes of demographic change, later a common trend, in the region date back to this 
area, exemplified by a unimplemented 1931 memorandum written by government minister 
Muhammad Kurd Ali, calling for Kurds to be “displaced to areas far from the borders of 
Kurdistan… [and granted] lands around Homs and Aleppo and to integrate them with the Arabs 
there.”39 Despite the brief prominence of a Kurdish-Christian autonomist alliance in the late 
1930s, which proved unable to mobilize the Kurdish population as whole, these nationalist fears 
of ‘separatism’ did not materialize and the Jazirah remained part of Syria into independence. 
Periodization of Syrian State Formation 
Syria attained independence in 1946 with what initially appeared to be a relatively stable 
domestic political situation. The anti-colonial movement had largely been led by established 
Sunni urban elite, and French attempts at segmenting Syria’s Arabic-speaking majority by 
religious affiliation had failed to prevent cross-sectarian nationalism. However, contradictions 
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within the political and economic systems of Syria, as a “semi-liberal oligarchic republic resting 
on a ‘feudal’ social base”40 with an increasingly educated populace, served to incubate and soon 
unleash societal unrest. The first twelve years of Syrian independence was characterized by 
intense political conflict based on revolving coalitions between the traditional landowning elite 
and their urban merchant allies desperate to maintain their status, a nascent capitalist class eager 
to reform social and economic relations along postwar lines, and a handful of progressive 
elements largely drawing from newly educated middle class provincial youth seeking to mobilize 
the vast numbers of Syrian peasantry against the elites. Rivalries between competing regional 
states and the developing bipolarity of the rising Cold War came to be mapped onto Syria’s 
turbulent domestic politics by the mid 1950s. Eventually, in 1958, when “top-down efforts to 
construct an inclusive, industrializing social pact failed and pluralist and parliamentary 
institutions broke down under the strain of severe social conflict,”41 left wing actors, represented 
by Arab Socialist Baʽath Party, the Syrian Communist Party and radical elements within the 
military, initiated the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) in which Syria’s sovereignty 
was subsumed by Nasserist Egypt. 
 From this point onward, processes of Syrian state formation can be periodized within 
three general periods. These begin with that of the modernizing authoritarian state, engaging in 
deeply penetrating, ideologically motivated interventions into society and economy, and lasting 
through several quite distinct iterations from 1958 to 1970. This is followed by the period of 
power consolidation as was undertaken by Hafez al-Asad in which regime stability and national 
security were prioritized over ideological considerations. Finally, as represented by the first 
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decade of Bashar al-Asad’s rule from 2000 to 2010, the state can be defined as post-populist 
authoritarianism in which new global economic and political realities lead to a renegotiating of 
the social pact and a controlled liberalization of the economy. Further elaboration on these 
periods is required before addressing them in relation to the Kurdish movement within Syria.  
 These twelve years between 1958 and 1970 are not commonly viewed in terms of 
continuity for obvious reasons. From 1958 to 1961, Syria was ruled from Cairo as the lesser of 
the UAR’s two regions. All political parties were disbanded and, while Syria had a regional 
administrative council this sat underneath a national assembly and President Nasser. In 
September 1961, Syrian sovereignty was restored through a coup carried out by military officers. 
This put into power the ‘Secessionist government,’ headed by President Nazim al-Qudsi who 
sought to reverse populist, left wing legislation passed under the UAR, most notably the 
Agrarian Reform Laws of 1958. A year and a half later, the Ba‘th party came to power in another 
coup. Over the next seven years the state was controlled by rivaling factions of the left wing 
Arab nationalist party, as internal contestations within the Ba‘th party resulted in an additional 
coup and several purges. 
 Much of the historiography covering this period between Syrian independence and Hafez 
al-Asad fails to piece together a systemic narrative of this turbulent era. Seminal titles in the 
field, such as Patrick Seale’s 1965 The Struggle for Syria and Nikolaos Van Dam’s 1979 The 
Struggle for Power in Syria approach this through a focus on the personalities and the cliques, 
comprised of figures sharing sectarian and geographic backgrounds, that seized and lost power 
over the state in this era. While both are compelling and valuable contributions to the study of 
the period, the approach put forth in Steven Heydemann’s Authoritarianism in Syria, probing 
conflict regarding the creation of a social pact and the impact of such on the development of state 
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institutions, brings to light certain junctures and continuities that can be lost in a more character-
focused analysis. For the purposes of this study, specifically in the relationship between state 
formation and the Kurdish minority sphere, Heydemann’s study is vital. Two related dynamics 
can be seen throughout UAR, secessionist and pre-Asad Ba‘th governments tying this period 
together.  
The first of these, “the authoritarian and countermobilizational mechanisms and routines 
established during the [UAR],”42 subsequently utilized by the secessionists and the Ba‘th 
governments in order to intervene in society and economy according to their divergent social 
visions. Despite rhetorical allusions to liberal governance, the secessionist government “sought 
to impose consent and compel the formation of a social pact through non-democratic means, 
adopting the same repressive practices as the regime it replaced,”43 ruling largely through 
emergency measures and decree. The Ba‘th ‘populist authoritarian’ model differed from the 
UAR and secessionists in that it actively sought popular mobilization against Syria’s capitalist 
and landlord classes, the historical antagonists of progressive economic reform. The future 
success of the Ba‘thi project was most directly threatened by the power of these upper segments 
of society; in the immediate circumstances by “the extent to which capitalists could undermine 
the party’s capacity to reorganize the Syrian political economy through their control over capital 
and other resources.”44 To address this weakness, the party prioritize the mobilization of 
controlled class conflict, using authoritarian power to take political control of bodies such as 
worker and peasant unions and restructure them into hierarchical, pyramidal structures directed 
by the Ba‘th.  
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Secondly, carried out through these “authoritarian…mechanisms and routines,” was a 
piecemeal but consistent state policy of Arabization, targeting its Kurdish population, the 
country’s largest non-Arab ethnic minority. These include legislation banning use of and 
instruction in the Kurdish language, widescale repression of the country’s first Kurdish 
nationalist party, the 1962 al-Hasakah census, to be discussed later, in addition to policies related 
to land ownership. Within Syria’s border regions, particularly in al-Hasakah, these Arabization 
“policies aimed at demographic change [and] maintained an upward trajectory”45 in their ferocity 
over time. While the ideological orientation of the state in this period oscillated, all governments 
from 1958 to 1970 enforced an Arab definition of Syria. This can most evidently be seen in the 
actions of the secessionist government, despite being formed as a rejection of the UAR’s pan-
Arabism, in their christening of the state’s return to sovereignty under the name of the Syrian 
Arab Republic, maintained to this day. That said, it was not always ideological fervor that 
dictated Arabization policies, but also fears related to the internal legitimacy and external 
stability of the state. 
The more ideological and unstable tendencies of the 1960s Ba‘th were subjugated by 
Hafez al-Asad and his so-called ‘Corrective movement.’ Beginning with an intra-party coup in 
1970, Asad’s reign lasted until his death thirty years later. This period of state formation was 
characterized by processes of regime consolidation, centered on “the incorporation of a 
significant array of interests – the army and the minorities as well as sections of key social 
forces, including the bourgeoise, the salaried middle class, the peasantry and the working class, 
[which] gave the regime a cross-class, urban-rural social based.”46 While the creation of the 
Ba‘th populist authoritarian state involved mobilizing the lower and middle classes against the 
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landed elites and capitalists, Asad oversaw a controlled reincorporation of such elites on a 
limited base. Additionally, the state tapped into existing networks of ordered around tribal and 
sectarian affiliation, previously deemed ‘reactionary,’ in an effort to expand the regime’s social 
base. This process of regime consolidation saw the state to maintain a degree of internal control 
unseen within post-colonial Syria, allowing the state to conduct an assertive foreign policy, 
challenging their regional rivals on the international stage to unprecedented degrees of success. 
In relation to this study, this self-confidence and ability allowed the Syrian regime to challenge 
Turkey and Iraq, in part through engagement in parallel diplomacy with Kurdish actors, when its 
interests and stability were perceived to be under threat. 
As the preeminent Arab ‘Republican Monarchy,’ Hafez al-Asad was succeeded by his 
son Bashar in 2000. The global context in which Hafez al-Asad’s processes of regime 
consolidation took place had drastically changed by this point, most notably with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. The loss of rent secured through Syria’s Cold War positioning and the 
declining productively of “state-led import substituting industrialization”47 policies placed 
significant stress the Syrian economy. In response to this new reality, Hafez al-Asad had 
overseen limited processes of market liberalization towards the end of his reign. Under Bashar 
al-Asad these would only accelerate as the state came to develop into what has been termed a 
‘post-populist authoritarian’ system. Despite the assertions of post-Cold War liberal ideology 
that market liberalization leads to democratization, such has not come to fruition in many cases 
examples. In the case of Syria 
 
“the authoritarian state [was] strengthened by access to new revenue sources and the 
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incorporation of previously hostile privileged social forces into its coalition; 
incorporation of the latter…[strengthened] the ability of rulers to marginalize (elite statist 
or mass populist) opposition.”48  
 
Under Bashar al-Asad, markets were opened and state-owned enterprises were privatized to new 
regime-connected capitalist elites while cuts to welfare and the gradual disempowerment of the 
traditional corporatist bodies shrunk the social base of the Ba‘th state. With a new non-
negotiated social pact, the regime came to increasingly rely on coercive measures in the face of 
growing unrest, including its interactions with an increasingly restless Kurdish population. 
Cracks within the system Hafez al-Asad created based on balancing various segments of society 
became apparent, exacerbated by the pressure the Syrian state was placed under in the mid-
2000s, primarily stemming from the United States and Europe.49 
 The dynamics within these periods of Syrian state formation informed the approach taken 
by the state when interacting with the Kurdish minority sphere. Arab nationalism was the official 
state ideology of Syria and discriminatory Arabization policy was carried out against Kurdish 
populations throughout this fifty-two year stretch of time. Despite this, state impetus was 
directed by domestic, regional and international pressures as well as the individual agency of 
those wielding state power. The fluctuations of state policy such dynamics invoked led to periods 
in which the Kurdish minority sphere and the space in which Kurdish political actors operated 
within broadened and narrowed. This paper will first address the 1962 al-Hasakah census as the 
most significant anti-Kurdish discriminatory policy initiative carried out by Damascus during the 
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period of nationalist authoritarian state formation.   
The 1962 al-Hasakah Census 
On October 5th, 1962 an extraordinary census was carried out in Syria’s northeastern 
governorate of al-Hasakah, as authorized by special decree No. 93. This was carried out across 
the province, village by village, in just one day, but the momentous ramifications of this survey 
continue to linger on for decades. The stated objective of the 1962 al-Hasakah census was to 
determine who in the province was a legitimate Syrian citizen and who was an illegal alien. This 
was to be based on the state’s newly redefined criteria which required inhabitants to prove 
residence in the country since 1945. According to the state, this was prompted by large numbers 
of foreigners from Turkey and Iraq having entered the country and settled down in this border 
province over the preceding two decades. However, the manner in which the census was carried 
out and the results that were subsequently enforced have led most observers to suggest other 
motivations. The census results found 120,000 residents of al-Hasakah, approximately 2.5% of 
the country’s total population according to the 1960 census,50 to be illegal aliens who were 
subsequently stripped of their citizenship and left stateless. The affected population was almost 
exclusive Kurdish and largely resided in close proximity to Syria’s borders with Turkey and Iraq. 
As alluded to earlier, Arab nationalist fears of ‘Kurdish separatism’ within the Syrian 
Jazirah only gained further purchase in the post-colonial era. While undoubtedly stoked by the 
dialectal interactions between the creation of the state of Israel and the increased grip of Arab 
nationalism on society, local dynamics relating to economic development and population growth 
gave it increased significance. With the sedentarization of the region beginning under the French 
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Mandate, “agriculture became a more common practice, boosted by the fertility of the region, 
that receives up to 400 mm of rain”51 yearly. By the 1950s, “the Jazira had replaced the Hawran 
as the prime granary and cotton region of Syria…[furthermore] the discovery and exploitation of 
oil at Qarachuk and Rumaylan”52 only heightening the region’s importance to the nascent state.  
The diverse and fast-growing demographics of the Jazirah gave the state an increased 
sense of urgency in securing its control over the region. The governorate of al-Hasakah, 
representing the most agriculturally productive part of the Jazirah, experienced tremendous 
population growth well into the 1960s. While a 1937 French report to the League of Nations 
listed the population at an estimated 156,000, it had doubled to 305,000 by 1961.53 Kurdish 
immigration played a role in this growth despite the post-colonial state’s termination of France’s 
refugee-friendly policies, though to what extent this was a factor is unclear in the scholarship. 
Overall, an increasing amount of the population came to be documented in civil records during 
this period, due to sedentarization and the expanded capacities of the state, and naturally high 
population growth was stoked by the region’s agricultural wealth.  
 It is within this local context that the 1962 al-Hasakah census was decreed and carried out 
by aforementioned secessionist government. Establishing control over this economically vital 
region was imperative to the authoritarian state and its modernization projects. Furthermore, for 
the secessionist government, Arabization efforts in the Jazirah could work to further the state’s 
Arab legitimacy despite it being the result of the dissolution of the UAR. While Syria existed 
within a precarious regional situation during the early post-colonial period, a status quo 
regarding the Kurdish minority sphere existed between itself, Turkey, and Iraq, allowing for 
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nationalist centralization efforts to occur without external interference via parallel diplomacy. 
While the political interests and alignments of the Iraqi and Syrian state had largely diverged at 
this time, the outbreak of war between Kurds and the Iraqi state in 1961 did not result in Syrian 
support of the KDP rebels. Instead, this conflict internally motivated the Syrian state to prevent 
spillover among its Kurdish populations, exemplified by Arabization efforts in the Jazirah, in 
addition to a short-lived intervention into northern Iraq conducted the year after the al-Hasakah 
census, on behalf of Baghdad.54  
 The 1962 al-Hasakah census affected a massive number of people, representing roughly 
20% of Syria’s Kurdish population at the time, in many ways due to a number of likely 
intentional discrepancies and issues with how it was executed. The day it was to be conducted 
was unannounced beforehand and caught many people by surprise, with little time to procure 
required documents. As “the Kurdish populations of this region were mostly rural and many 
were illiterate and had little contact with any state officials,”55 many apparently had little idea as 
to what the ramifications of this survey would be. Furthermore, a significant portion of the rural 
population at the time were not included in civil registers, did not possess bills or receipts from 
the state, and worked and resided on land through verbal agreements with landlords. Some 
reportedly avoided the census takers in order to escape mandatory military service. Outside of 
these factors, the census was carried out in an arbitrary manner as “brothers from the same 
families, born in the same Syrian villages, were classified differently…Fathers became 
foreigners while their sons remained citizens.”56 Notable figures who had long played a role in 
Syrian politics and government were also among those stripped of their citizenship, including 
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“Tawfiq Nizam Eddin, a former Syrian army commander, and his brother Abdel Baky Nizam 
Eddin, who held several ministerial positions between 1949 and 1957,”57 the descendants of a 
founding member of the French Mandate Syrian parliament, as well as family members of Ismail 
Ibrahim Pasha Malli and Ma‘mo Ibrahami Pasha Malli, ethnic Kurds who had participated in the 
Arab campaign against the Ottoman.  
 Those stripped of the citizenship by the 1962 census fell under either one of two 
categories; ajnabi (plural: ajanib) meaning ‘foreigner,’ or maktoum (plural: maktoumin) 
meaning ‘concealed.’ The former were subsequently stateless, but their names recorded in a 
separate civil register, while the latter are those were left completely unregistered by the state. 
The ajanib were supplied identification papers stating “‘He had no name available in the 
registration lists of Syrian Arabs specific to Hasakeh,’”58 entitling them to some rights and 
recognition from the state, though not including travel abroad. Meanwhile, the maktoumin were 
provided no form of identification outside of a letter they must secure written by the local 
mukhtar and signed by the local police chief, testifying to their identity. As Syrian nationality 
law dictates that citizenship is awarded patrilineally, a child born to non-citizen father becomes 
ajnabi or maktoum, depending on various configurations of parental status, meaning the 
populations of ajanib and maktoumin have only grown with time. Recent estimates of exact 
number of stateless Kurds vary; in a 1996 report on the topic, HRW cited sources listing the total 
number without citizenship residing within the al-Hasakah province at around 200,000, while 
information provided to them by the Syrian government stated that the ajanib population was 
67,465 while the maktoumin numbered at 75,000.59 Meanwhile a report conducted in 2018 by 
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Syrians for Truth & Justice, based on “access to inside information from official sources in the 
Personal Status Department of al-Hasakah,”60 listed the ajanib at 346,242 and the maktoumin at 
171,300, as of 2011.  
 This stateless status has had debilitating effects on generations of Syria’s Kurds. 
Existence as an ajnabi or maktoum is one with limited or no access to education past a certain 
level, many forms of employment, health care, marriage, property ownership, and freedom of 
movement. The ajanib possess some rights due to their registered status but these are still of a 
quite limited capacity. For example, they are able to enroll in higher education institutes, 
however, after graduation, “‘they were denied the right to obtain a certified university certificate, 
that cut them off from working in the public sector and from joining union trades.’”61 
Furthermore, their position is stigmatize in society overall and their identification papers make 
obscuring this status impossible. Given the legal status potential future children would carry, 
marriage prospects are often limited to with those in a similar position. The situation of the 
maktoumin is even more degrading, as they are not guaranteed access to education above a 
secondary level. Significant numbers of stateless Kurds have left the province seeking 
opportunities in large cities to the west, but as testified by one maktoum, “‘the situation outside 
al-Hasakah was far worse, the employees of government institutions and the ordinary people are 
not familiar with the maktumeen issue, and when I tell them that I don’t have a Syrian ID, they 
think I’m a foreigner.’”62 The economic and societal precarity created by the effects of the 1962 
census have left large amounts of Syria’s Kurdish population socially alienated and largely 
preoccupied by matters of survival. 
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The effects of the al-Hasakah census, the creation of the Kurdish ajanib and maktoumin 
underclass, has become “one of the Kurds’ most enduring grievances against the Syrian state and 
one of the central pillars of Kurdish political party grievances.”63 However, the Kurdish 
nationalist movement has historically struggled to incorporate these stateless Kurds into party 
mobilization and, as of 2011, no members of this segment of Kurdish society had ever entered 
leadership positions within any nationalist party. The burdens placed on the ajanib and 
maktoumin by the state have meant that “consciousness has easily been dominated by economic 
issues such as employment, daily income and food,”64 rather than political activity, serving as an 
impediment to nationalist mobilization. Furthermore, their disadvantaged legal status has meant 
that stateless Kurds are often reliant on representatives of the state in securing documents and 
permissions “in order to maintain their standard of living or improve it.”65 This exposes 
individuals to increased coercion and possible cooption by the mukhabarat. For example, in 
testimony published by a Syrian human rights organization, an ajnabi press photographer from 
the al-Hasakah city of Serê Kaniyê (Arabic: Ras al-‘Ain) recalls attempting to gain approval 
from State Security to enroll in education past an intermediate level, “who in turn asked us to be 
informers and report the news of our neighbours.’”66 According to field research conducted by 
Harriet Allsopp, knowledge of this dynamic led many Kurds to consider the stateless to be 
potentially politically compromised. While political participation has been obstructed as a result 
of legal status, it appears to have to have had an opposite effect on the political identities of 
Syria’s stateless Kurds. While the economic results have been limited, “the solidarity and sense 
of community within Kurdish society has facilitated mechanisms of support for this group that 
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are otherwise absent in Syrian society,”67 amplifying identification with a Kurdish cultural and 
political identity.  
The effects of the state’s Arabization policies on the Kurdish minority, in particular the 
creation of the ajanib and maktoumin, largely resulted in the localization of Kurdish nationalist 
politics. These policies, first implemented under the period of authoritarian state formation 
during a period of regional status quo, have come to define relations between the Syrian Arab 
state sphere and the Kurdish minority sphere that exists in Syria, and are the predominant focal 
point of local Kurdish nationalist activism. While Kurds as a whole are denied recognition of 
national rights in Syria, the issue of legal statelessness among a significant portion of the 
population forces the movement as a whole to maintain that they are part of Syria and aspire to 
be viewed as such. This localized focus on the Syrian state has constricted local nationalist 
parties from engaging in whatever limited possibilities of crossborder nationalist mobilization 
existed and differentiated their platforms from neighboring manifestations of Kurdish 
nationalism. However, the coercive approach the state applied to the Kurdish minority sphere 
also worked to instill solidarity and a sense of groupness amongst the Kurdish population, as 
Arabization addressed these geographically and politically diverse communities within a single 
ethnic framework.  
Up until the present day, these dynamics have come to shape and define the ‘parties of 
1957,’ referring to the organizations formed through the splintering and reconfigurations of the 
original Kurdish nationalist party in Syria, the Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê (PDK-S). 
When the Syrian republic was dissolved into the Nasser-led UAR project in 1958, the PDK-S 
immediately drew the suspicions and ire of the Arab nationalist state. In 1960, Ministry of the 
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Interior “General Abd al-Hamid Sarraj launched the ‘Great Campaign’…in which more than 
5,000 members and supporters of the party were arrested, including the majority of the party 
leadership.”68 In the wake of this large-scale repression of the party, fractures emerged within the 
movement. These initial divisions occurred over framing and strategy; between a left, holding 
the position that Kurds represented a second nation in Syria, and a right maintaining Kurds were 
an ethnic minority. While addressing the further splintering of the movement is beyond the scope 
of this paper, in general it can be stated that as a collective, the imaginations and activities of the 
‘parties of 1957’ have been historically oriented towards the Syrian state. While the content of 
their nationalism employs civilizational and modernizing discourses, these parties have relied on 
“pre-existing social networks” within Kurdish society, such as tribal affiliations, and the 
“incorporation of these power relations…worked to maintain social divisions in Kurdish society 
and to limit the political actions available to these parties.”69 The Syrian Kurdish political 
landscape has not been contained within the activities of the localized ‘parties of 1957,’ however, 
as new highly influential dynamics and orientations were introduced with the entrance and 
empowerment of the PKK in Syria, during the 1980s. 
The Entrance of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party into Syria 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party was founded in the cities of western Turkey in the late 
1970s, as part of a broader milieu of radical Turkish and Kurdish leftist organizations 
proliferating at the time. With the domestic situation appearing ever perilous for the Turkish 
state, a crackdown on these groups in general was initiated in 1979.70 A year later, the military 
would take things into its own hands and launch a coup, the ramifications of which live on in 
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Turkish society to this day. Thousands of leftists and Kurdish nationalists were imprisoned in the 
1980s, and the relative political openness of the preceding decades that had allowed such 
movements to incubate ceased to exist as civil society was brought under the strict control of the 
military-run state. PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan fled Turkey a year prior to the coup, on July 4th, 
1979. With the PKK was facing increased state repression and the capture of one of the 
organization’s leaders, Öcalan made the decision to cross into Syria. This was facilitated through 
the familial network of one of the party’s members, from the border town of Suruç.71 Öcalan 
crossed into the adjacent town of Kobanî, the center of one of northern Syria’s three Kurdish-
populated regions.  
 While sourcing is relatively scant regarding entirety of the PKK’s eighteen-year presence 
in Syria it’s clear that the relationship between the Syrian regime and PKK took several years to 
develop. Initially, Öcalan struggled to make the connections necessary for the organization’s 
survival. It appears that he was initially motivated to reach out to Palestinian resistance 
organizations at the time operating in Lebanon; specifically, the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). This was facilitated through Öcalan’s Syrian Kurdish contacts, 
who put him in touch with members of the Iraqi Kurdish PUK, whose leadership was at the time 
based in Syria and Lebanon. Öcalan made his way to Beirut and, by way of the Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK), landed a meeting with the DFLP.72 This developed into a relationship which 
allowed for PKK members to be housed and undergo training at the military camps of the DFLP. 
In turn, in a roundabout way, this gave the PKK access to the Syrian regime, a sponsor of the 
DFLP at the time. After the 1980 coup, Öcalan sent word to PKK militants still in Turkey, and 
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secured passage for them to enter Lebanon by way of Syria.73 The Syrian state was aware of this 
Kurdish militant movement operating across its borders the entire time. However, due to the 
regional and global political situation, Syria looked favorably on a host of international leftist 
groups and tolerated these developments. 
 By 1982 it appears that the Öcalan had secured a favorable relationship with the Syrian 
regime. The second party congress was held at a DFLP camp in Syria’s Dar‘a governorate,74 
located in the country’s south by the Jordanian border. At this point, the PKK had stabilized the 
disastrous situation it had found itself in following the 1980 Turkish coup. While thousands of its 
members had been arrested in Turkey, significant amounts of militants had escaped to Syria and 
by then preparing for war. Launched in 1984, the PKK’s successful initiation of its guerilla 
campaign against Turkey caught the state off guard, increasingly upsetting the security situation 
implemented in the wake of the 1980 coup. 
The success of the Kurdish insurgents demonstrated them to be a valuable asset to Syria 
in its interstate competition with Turkey. Relations between the two countries had never been 
particularly cordial largely due to two factors. Syria has never recognized Turkish sovereignty 
over the coastal Alexandretta (Turkish: Hatay) region, part of the Ottoman province of Aleppo 
and later the Syrian Mandate, which was transferred to Turkey by the French in 1939. 
Additionally, the Cold War alliances saw Syria and Turkey on opposing sides of global 
bipolarity, with the former being a key regional ally of the Soviet Union and the latter being a 
NATO member state. Despite these tensions interstate status quo existed into the 1970s, with 
Syria being in no position to address the issue of Alexandretta. These conditions changed in 1980 
when Turkey announced the GAP (Turkish: Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi), a “mega-development 
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project consisting of twenty-two dams and nineteen [hydroelectric power plants] …on the 
Euphrates and Tigris rivers.”75 As the Euphrates is the main source of Syria’s overall water 
supply, irrigating large quantities of country’s agricultural fields, the GAP represented a serious 
threat to Syria’s water and food security. Through engaging in parallel diplomacy and providing 
semi-clandestine support of the PKK, the Syrian state saw “an opportunity to force an agreement 
on the shared waters of the Euphrates and Tigris.”76 This did indeed lead to a bilateral agreement 
between the two states regarding the flow of the Euphrates in 1987, though Turkish 
noncompliance and other issues related to water meant that the interstate conflict would linger 
for another decade. The partnership settled on between the Syrian state and the PKK was in 
many ways indicative of Hafez al-Asad’s pragmatic approach to both in external and internal 
politics, working to strengthen the state sphere in spite of regional and domestic threats. 
 The PKK proved quite valuable to the state on a domestic level, presenting new 
opportunities in the state’s approach to the Kurdish minority sphere. While the general 
tendencies of Hafez al-Asad’s regime consolidation approach to state formation saw a 
dampening of ideological opposition to domestic opponents in favor of incorporation, this had 
not occurred with relation to Syria’s Kurdish population. Rather, further Arabization policies 
were enacted by al-Asad in the early 1970s, most notably the attempt at creating an ‘Arab Belt’ 
in northern al-Hasakah province, through the settlement of Arab communities from elsewhere in 
Syria and further dispossession of local Kurds from their properties. However, these state efforts 
were soon interrupted by rising discontent and the outbreak of insurgency by Islamist actors 
largely affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. These dynamics peaked in 1982 as exemplified 
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by the Hama uprising and subsequent massacre conducted by the state’s military and security 
forces. The coercive approach of the Arab state to Syria’s Kurdish populations was deprioritized 
in order to prevent the proliferation of internal dissent. It was in these regards that the PKK 
represented potential outlet for the country’s oppressed Kurdish minority. 
 Over the course of the 1980s, Syria came to represent much more than a place of refuge 
from Turkish state repression that it had been when the organization first arrived. Initially 
facilitated by the wide space awarded to it by the Syrian state, the PKK soon became the 
preeminent actor inside the local Kurdish minority sphere. Most significant to the organization 
itself and its conflict with Turkey was the ability to openly recruit from Syria’s Kurdish 
populations. The party proved to have significant appeal to thousands of local Kurdish youth, 
attributable to a number of factors. Among these were its organized militancy, which had 
attraction in itself but also “aroused sympathy because it brought the possibility of real political 
achievements, in contrast to the clandestine activities of other Syrian Kurdish parties, which 
rarely bore fruit.”77 The charisma of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan was another recruitment draw, 
standing in stark contrast to the infighting-prone leaders of Syrian Kurdish parties. 
Representative of both this and the leeway given to the party by the state, “portraits of 
Öcalan…replaced those of Hafiz al-Assad in public spaces such as shops and workplaces.”78 
Furthermore, with its Marxist Leninist ideology, the party “promoting gender equality among the 
Kurdish population in Syria and searched to undermine the basis of the tribal and religious 
allegiances that formed the basis of the traditional Kurdish political elite.”79 The PKK also 
reportedly had an understanding with the Syrian state, that its local recruits would be omitted 
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from mandatory military service in the Syrian Arab Army,80 undoubtedly another attractive 
aspect the party held in the eyes of local Kurdish youth. Through these recruitment endeavors, 
the make-up of the party’s membership came to include a significant Syrian Kurdish contingent. 
This is reflected in the findings of a 2016 report on the PYD and the PKK in Syria, as  
 
“A noted Kurdish analyst contended that more than one-third of PKK members are 
Syrian. Another claimed that up to 20 percent of the group’s fighters at its base in Qandil, 
Iraq, are Syrian… Meanwhile, a Western diplomat posited that “a former PKK member is 
buried in almost every Kurdish village in Syria.”81 
 
Emblematic of the importance this recruitment base has played within the PKK, a Syrian Kurd 
by the name of Fehman Huseyin82 was appointed head of the party’s armed forces in 2007. 
 Overlapping with its recruitment efforts, the PKK used its privileged position vis-à-vis 
the state to carry out cultural activism and educational work amongst Syria’s Kurdish 
populations. By the late 1980s, the party maintained offices across the country, locals would 
interact with “leading cadres of the PKK—up to Abdullah Öcalan— [who were] coming to cities 
like Tirbespî, Amûde, Dêrik, Kobanî and [Efrîn] to give education programs on Kurdish identity, 
women ́s liberation and self-organization.”83 While Syria’s Kurdish parties had long engaged in 
cultural production and education, the room the PKK was given to maneuver within allowed the 
party to “very quickly [succeed] in steering Kurdish culture away from the private sphere toward 
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the public arena, using means such as openly celebrating the Newroz festival.”84 Particularly 
with the case of Newroz, a holiday marking the beginning of spring, this entrance into the public 
sphere marked a dramatic shift, as prior to the arrival of the PKK “families would generally 
celebrate as a group; placing candles in the window of the home was a common practice, 
symbolic of the fire signaling revolution in traditional folklore.”85 Kurdish parties like the PDK-
S were primarily based in the Jazirah, the primary site of the state’s most vociferous Arabization 
policies, and had largely neglected Kurd Dagh and Kobanî, the other two regions of Kurdish 
settlement in northern Syria. The PKK was quite successful in filling this vacuum to the point 
where, in Kurd Dagh, where “the majority of Newroz celebrations were organized by the PKK 
and it is reported that their presence and position in the region was so great that effectively 
controlled the area.”86 Additionally, during a rare period in which the Ba‘th slightly loosened its 
control of legislative elections, “six Kurds in Kurd-Dagh openly representing themselves as 
supporters of the [PKK] were elected to parliament”87 in May 1990. 
 Through the alliance between the PKK and the Syrian state under Hafez al-Asad, a 
product of ‘parallel diplomacy,’ the local Kurdish minority sphere saw a dramatic increase in 
regionalization. Through the space awarded to it by the state due to overlapping interests with 
regards to Turkey, PKK activism “led to an increasing awareness of the Kurdish identity in Syria 
and to the strengthening of the pan-Kurdist ideal by ‘proxy’.”88 As outlined by Bozarslan, 
engaging in ‘parallel diplomacy’ for the sake of organization empowerment comes with risks for 
both the minority sphere and the Kurdish political parties involved. The PKK was acting in Syria 
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under conditions closely watched by the state, whose “primary rule was that [it] could do nothing 
that threatened Syria’s national integrity.”89 Therefore, the PKK was prevented from addressing 
the primary grievances Kurds in Syria held with regards to the state; these being lack of national 
recognition, the consistent policies of Arabization imposed since 1958, and the related stateless 
of hundreds of thousands of Kurds. While the PKK was capable of instilling or expanding upon 
local sentiments of Kurdishness, and offered an outlet for such, this was in expense of activism 
on behalf of local conditions. The limitations of ‘parallel diplomacy’ clearly manifested itself for 
the PKK in 1998, when a détente between Syria and Turkey saw the former turn its back on its 
non-state allies and eject Öcalan and the organization from its borders, harshly repressing the 
local membership.  
 The party’s expulsion from Syria and the subsequent arrest of Abdullah Öcalan 
temporarily crippled the PKK. Within Syria, the party’s alliance with the state ended overnight 
and it’s two-decade long position of privilege was quickly replaced by one of state repression. 
Kurdish politics in Syria were re-localized, as the regional mobilization conducted by the PKK 
largely ceased and a regional status quo between Syria, Turkey and Iraq emerged with regards to 
the Kurdish question. Despite this, the effects of long-term local activism by the PKK would 
linger on, as Kurdish identity and culture had been brought into the public sphere in 
unprecedented ways. The regime of new president Bashar al-Asad would soon have to address 
the ramifications of such within an increasingly unstable domestic and international climate.  
The 2004 al-Qamishli Uprising 
In March of 2004, an incident occurring at a soccer match in the city of al-Qamishli 
sparked an unprecedented wave of Kurdish anti-state demonstrations across the country. While 
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these protests were soon extinguished by a brutal state repression campaign utilizing deadly 
force, mass arrests and torture, “the al-Qamishli revolt (Serhildan) signified the beginning of a 
new era for Kurdish populations in Syria.”90 Building on dynamics emerging within the Kurdish 
minority sphere over the previous decades, the March 2004 protests represented the first act of 
spontaneous mass mobilization around Kurdish identity, with little role played by the traditional 
Kurdish nationalist parties. Furthermore, these events symbolized an overcoming of the 
geographic and historical divisions which had previously worked to obstruct or conceal Kurdish 
national sentiment.  
On March 12, 2004, the al-Futuwah soccer team from the Arab city of Deir ez-Zour 
traveled to al-Qamishli to play the local al-Jihad team. Before the match even began clashes 
broke out between the two fan groups. While it’s unclear what exactly sparked the fighting, 
reporting at the time “pointed out that [these events], in one way or another, were tightly linked 
to the ongoing war in the neighboring country, Iraq.”91 Lying on the Euphrates river close to 
border, Deir ez-Zour is home to several prominent Arab tribes whose members reside in both 
Syria and Iraq, traditionally strong supporters of the Ba‘thist regime in Iraq. Rhetoric used by al-
Futuwah fans during the fighting made clear references to the situation in the country at the time, 
following the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Provisionary Constitution awarded Iraqi Kurds 
autonomy, signed four days prior. Chants referring to Iraqi Sunni stronghold of Fallujah, praising 
Saddam for his repression of Iraq’s Kurds, and insulting the main Iraqi Kurdish leaders Masoud 
Barzani and Jal Talabani rang out throughout the day.92 In response, the local al-Qamishli fans 
chanting slogans in support of US President George W. Bush. The fighting appears to have been 
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relatively vicious as al-Futuwah fans managed to smuggle in rocks and sticks, in addition to 
edged weapons. A rumor that three children had been killed in the fighting, spread by way of the 
game’s radio broadcast, “led many people from the city and the surrounding towns, even from 
Tirbesipî and ʿAmudah, to come to the stadium.”93 Security forces soon arrived and began using 
live ammunition to empty the stadium and disperse the crowds that had gathered out front. They 
opened fire on civilians, ultimately resulting in the deaths of six individuals, all Kurds.94  
Rioting soon broke out as locals reacted viscerally to this news. Quickly the outrage 
manifested itself against representations of the state. Retelling his experiences of March 12th, 
which began for him with spontaneously joining in a gathered mass, a local ajnabi Kurd only 
seventeen at the time recalls 
 
In the neighborhood were signs associated with the Arab Socialist al-Ba'ath Party and 
photos of the late president Hafez al-Assad. I remember that we broke the signs down and 
shredded the photos. And then, we headed towards the granaries, where several 
policemen were positioned. The people stoned them, but the policemen retaliated with 
fire. We immediately alienated ourselves from the source of the bullets and headed to the 
Train Station. The masses were outraged. Many young people stormed the station and 
brought out a military vehicle, which they said belonged to the Station’s director. We 
rendered the car malfunction. We also turned into pieces the president’s photos, in 
addition to the flags and signs of the al-Ba’ath Party and the state. There were computers 
also, we shattered these too. We headed to the nearest police station in the al-Antariya 
next. We let ourselves in the station and there was no personnel inside. The police 
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uniforms were hanging there, for the policemen have presumably put on civilian clothes 
and abandoned the station. We sat the station ablaze and went on the main street, from 
where we headed to the city market.95 
 
Several of the demonstrators were killed by security forces that night before the violence 
subsided. On March 13th, “the bodies of Kurds killed the day before were carried through the 
streets of al-Qamishli by a crowd of almost 100,000,”96 initially proceeding peacefully, before 
security forces again sought to disperse the crowd with live fire. Demonstrations against the state 
violence, likely intensified by rumors of a massacre, soon burst out in all the major Kurdish 
towns and cities of the Jazirah, as well as in Kobanî, Efrîn, Aleppo and Damascus, covering all 
regions with significant Kurdish population. At the university of Damascus, news of the March 
12th events had already reached Kurdish students the same night. A student at down, originally 
from a town near the al-Hasakah city of Dêrik remembers 
 
We started watching over how the matter would turn out and decided to take a stand and 
protest in solidarity with the Kurds and the wounded... It was the first time we held such a 
protest.97 
 
The initial crowds that congregated in al-Qamishli on March 12th and 13th were reported 
represented of the city’s diverse population, including Kurds, Arabs, and Syriac Christians, 
assembling in mourning and anger over those killed. However, this changed rapidly as “the 
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demonstrations in al-Qamishli and elsewhere took a markedly political turn…[as] the 
participants brandished Kurdish flags and chanted Kurdish slogans.”98 In several places, 
including the cities of Serê Kaniyê and al-Hasakah, some members of local Arab populations 
joined in the violence on the side of the security forces, clashing with protests and looting 
Kurdish businesses. By March 16th, the demonstrations subsided later in the face of a massive 
arrest campaign carried out by security services in which an estimate two thousand Kurds were 
detained. The casualties incurred by civilians at the hands of the states “amounted to no less than 
36 dead persons, mostly Kurds, and the injury of more than 160 others.”99 
The countrywide protests of 2004 were only in part organized by parties. Mobilization, 
particular in al-Qamishli itself, was largely spontaneous. Testimony collected afterwards from 
participants demonstrates that many who partook in the demonstrations dwell little on why they 
did so. A sense of imperativeness and naturalness is conveyed by these interlocutors. Making a 
distinction between party mobilization and spontaneous ‘ethnic riots,’ Brubaker highlights that in 
the case of the latter, “much of the actual violence is committed by broader sets of participants 
acting in relatively spontaneous fashion and in starkly polarized situations characterized by high 
levels of groupness.”100 A ‘high level of groupness’ was clearly on display throughout the events 
of 2004.   
 As the first violent and spontaneous mobilization of Kurdish nationalism within Syrian 
history, the al-Qamishli uprising was in many ways a result of the expansion of the Kurdish 
minority sphere in preceding decades. This expansion largely occurred through party activism in 
the cultural domain, in addition to an increased connectivity of the Kurdish minority sphere 
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across Syria, Turkey, Iraq and Iran by way of new communications technology. Furthermore, the 
state Arabization policies, approaching Syria’s Kurdish communities unambiguously as Kurds 
and forcing many to rely on ethnic compatriots to mitigate state pressure, had instilled increased 
nation identity amongst this population. While the PKK had been forced out of Syria in 1998, its 
legacy left a long shadow over the Kurdish sphere in Syria, most notably in bringing Kurdish 
cultural and political activity from the private to the public setting. In the post-PKK era, this was 
continued by two recently formed parties, Yekîtî and the PYD, who, unlike the PKK, conducted 
this public activism in the face of state repression. The former, at the forefront of this new shape 
of political engagement was founded on “two pillars: more ‘visibility’ (publications, 
campaigning, protesting, demonstrations, assembling, striking) and territorial demands (Syrian 
Kurdistan),”101 representing a stark contrast from the older parties which made limited cultural 
demands regarding Syria’s Kurds and did so with clandestine negotiations with the regime. The 
PYD, the local PKK affiliate formed soon after its departure, maintained the same militant 
attitude and skill organizational capacities as its parent organization, albeit now oriented towards 
the Syrian context.  
 In preceding decades, Syrian Kurdish parties were the sole actors able to collect resources 
sufficient to carry out Kurdish cultural activities in Syria. These attempts at instilling groupness 
were always limited in reach by the repressive climate parties operated in. While the PKK’s 
alliance with the state had allowed for a broadening of such, latter developments appear to have 
had an even greater affect. In 1995 the first Kurdish language satellite television channels were 
established. Soon, the access to this technology in Syria and the number of channels, based in 
Europe and later Iraqi Kurdistan, proliferated. Through these channels, many operated by parties 
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across all of Kurdistan,  
 
the Kurdish population [in Syria] was exposed to a constant stream of news about the 
Kurdish regions, educational films on Kurdish issues, documentaries, chat shows, 
Kurdish language programmes, political propaganda and music, all of which stimulated 
the interest of Syrian Kurds in their heritage and history and culture as well as their desire 
for political results inside Syria.102 
 
Having a similar effect in instilling groupness and expanding the Kurdish imagined community 
was the introduction of the internet and cell phone technology in the following decade. During 
the first decade of Bashar al-Asad’s rule these technologies were less accessible than satellite 
television, but particularly affect the youth population more likely to use such, creating an 
independent Kurdish sphere, largely outside the control of political parties.  
 The al-Qamishli uprising occurred within a broader landscape of increased opposition 
activity and ethnic mobilizations across Syria during the first decade of Bashar al-Asad’s rule. 
While the Kurdish case is an outlier in many regards, changes in overall state-society relations 
overseen by Bashar al-Asad factor in to explaining why this large-scale spontaneous outburst 
occurred. The withdrawal of the state on its end of the populist authoritarian social contract 
facilitated a rise in disenfranchisement and grievances within a number of segments within 
Syrian society, the Kurdish minority sphere being no exception. Additionally, “expectations had 
climbed when the young president, during his inaugural speech, described a need for reform”103 
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in ambiguous statements, leading to the creation of a number of civil society initiatives and 
statements calling for democratic reforms signed by a diverse collection of opposition 
representatives. In al-Qamishli, “a group of Kurdish intellectuals founded the Bedirxan forum 
and…began to contemplate establishing relations with the representatives of the ‘Syrian 
opposition.’”104 This so-called ‘Damascus Spring’ was quickly suppressed by the regime, 
however opposition activities continued. They bubbled up into the public sphere yet again 
between 2003 and 2007. This time “energized by the fall of Iraq’s Ba‘thist regime after US 
intervention, Syrian dissidents mobilized,” opposition activists published the ‘Damascus 
Declaration’ which called “for a ‘comprehensive and complete democratic transformation’ in 
Syria from the mukhabarat state to a civilian/democratic state.”105 Once the external threats to 
the state from the US and Europe diminished, state repression ratcheted up, successfully 
demobilizing opposition activity by force. Seeking to gain new state revenues through economic 
liberalization, Bashar al-Asad’s transition of the state into a post-populist authoritarian created 
new scales of discontent through revisions to the social pact and early, vague statements of 
reform by the new president. Through the contracting of the state and the cutting of welfare and 
subsidies, the system of state-society relations and political management established by Hafez al-
Asad began to unravel, leaving coercion to be the primary tool available to the state with regards 
to social control.  
The change in relations between the state-Kurdish relations was compounded by 
crossborder dynamics, both at a state level and within the Kurdish sphere. By the turn of the 
century, Syrian relations with both Turkey and Iraq had improved significantly and the context 
that led Hafez al-Asad to pursue ‘parallel diplomacy’ with Kurdish actors had dissipated. The 
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new regional situation was rocked by the legitimation of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s 
autonomy facilitated by the US invasion of Iraq, but mutual interest in limiting the crossborder 
impacts of such maintained the status quo on the Kurdish issue between Syria, Turkey and Iran. 
These reverberations were quite present within the Kurdish minority sphere, as the 
unprecedented success of the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq expanded the possible 
horizons of Kurdish mobilization. Furthermore, the intense international pressure placed on the 
Syrian state at the time led many to make the assumption that the regime was in decline, quite 
possibly under threat of external intervention. While this did not materialize, the US intervention 
in Iraq and the subsequent creation of a federal state guaranteeing Kurdish autonomy clearly 
reverberated within Syria’s Kurdish and state spheres.  
Conclusion 
Using Bozarslan’s conceptualization of the ‘Kurdish issue’ as it’s methodological 
framework, this paper has sought to shed light on the Kurdish nationalist movement in Syria with 
regards the local and regional dimensions. The Kurdish minority sphere, the field in which 
Kurdish populations and political actors operate, exists within four neighboring states. These 
states have each based their legitimacy and development on nationalist ideologies that exclude 
Kurdish populations, categorizing them as a national other. When a regional status quo exists, 
the power of these state spheres can restrict and segment the Kurdish minority sphere, limiting 
crossborder movement and interactions and the potential for Kurdish nationalist mobilization at a 
regional level. When this status quo breaks down into interstate conflict, states have proven 
willing to engage Kurdish political actors that exist below the state level, employing parallel 
diplomacy in order to weaken their state rivals. The recognition that this awards strengthens 
Kurdish political actors and can serve to regionalize their actions and broaden the political 
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imaginations of local Kurdish communities to the regional level. Simultaneously, this largely 
results in a negation of local Kurdish political activity in the state conducting such diplomacy.  
 The dynamics of the international stage are not the only forces that constrict or augment 
the potential for nationalist mobilization within the Kurdish minority sphere. Similar to other 
ethnic groups in the region and beyond, national identity was not a common axis of political 
activity prior to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, instead largely superseded by sub-national or 
supra-national identities based on kinship, geography, or religion. Since then, the Kurdish 
imagined community has become an increasingly salient focus for political mobilization. This 
has been inculcated by a number of factors including the activism of nationalist elites, 
associations and parties, the normalization of the nation-state as the preeminent form of global 
political organization, state formation as conducted by non-Kurdish nationalists addressing 
Kurds as a national other, and the increasing crossborder communications between Kurds. 
 Within the Syrian case, Kurds faced intense policies of Arabization conducted by the 
nationalist authoritarian state. As potential for mobilization was weakened by state violence, 
Kurdish populations’ focus on economic survival, and a constricting of the crossborder 
dynamics, the parties of 1957 and their ever-fracturing nature came to be entirely localized in 
scope. This context shifted with the process of regime consolidation under Hafez al-Asad and the 
breakdown of the regional status quo. The Kurdish minority sphere expanded as parallel 
diplomacy conducted by the state gave the PKK the ability to mobilize Kurds in Syria. This era 
consisted of a regionalization of Kurdish political imaginations in Syria, to the neglect of 
political activism addressing local grievances, in addition to the unprecedented emergence of a 
public Kurdish cultural sphere. Parallel diplomacy abruptly ended ushering in a new regional 
status quo. While the parties of 1957 and the PKK were in poor shape to challenge the state, the 
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mass mobilization along the axis of Kurdish national identity occurred nonetheless, in a largely 
spontaneous fashion represented by the 2004 Serhildan. In the context of ambiguous 
renegotiations of social contract by the post-populist authoritarian state, under great international 
stress, the 2004 al-Qamishli uprising appeared as a simultaneous regionalization of Kurdish 
national identity and localization of political activity.  
The Kurdish minority sphere in Syria has expanded and contracted overtime due to 
fluctuations in the power of the state sphere and the interlinked capability of crossborder 
dynamics from other parts of Kurdistan to penetrate. In 2012, within the context of the Syrian 
Civil War, the state completely vacated northern Syria, allowing for the greatest enlargement of 
the Kurdish minority sphere yet. Without having to rely on parallel diplomacy with neighboring 
states, Kurdish political actors were able to capitalize on the receding of the state and increased 
crossborder activity, mobilizing the Kurdish population in an unprecedented fashion. While this 
has greatly amplified the position of Rojava within the regional Kurdish imagination, it remains 
to be seen what future shifts in regional interstate relations will mean for the Kurdish minority 
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